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Timing Rules and Legal Institutions
Jacob E. Gersen* and Eric A. Posner**
Abstract. Constitutional and legislative restrictions on the timing of legislation and regulation are
ubiquitous but these “timing rules” have received little attention in the legal literature. Yet the
timing of a law can be just as important as its content. The timing of a law determines whether its
benefits are created sooner or later, and how the costs and benefits are spread across time, and
hence to the advantage and disadvantage of different private groups, citizens, and elected officials.
We argue that timing rules are, and should be, used to reduce agency problems within the
legislature and between the legislature and the public, and to mitigate deliberative pathologies.
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INTRODUCTION
Most fights about new legislation focus on the legislation’s substance. Yet
legislators regularly decide not just what to do, but when to do it, and often decisions
about the timing of new law are just as critical as decisions about the content of new law.
If a main goal of institutional design is to guard against undesirable legislative activity,
regulating the timing of legislative choice might be more effective than directly
regulating the content of legislation, or so we shall argue below.
In the United States Congress and many other legislatures, choice about timing is
heavily regulated by what we term timing rules, which have been largely ignored in the
legal literature,1 and understudied in economics2 and political science.3 This is
unfortunate because a panoply of constitutional, statutory, and internal congressional
rules constrain the timing of legislative action, and “the mere timing of a vote can mean
1

The closest work in the legal literature is on the related but distinct topics of entrenchment and
retroactivity. See, Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. BAR F. RES. J. 379 (1987). See also John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport,
Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L. J. 1665 (2002);
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. J. 491 (1997).
Prominent recent treatments of retroactivity include DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (Chicago 2000); Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731
(1991); Michael Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1985); Michael Graetz, Legal
Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977).
2

The relevant economics literature on timing generally focuses on options theory. For an introduction, see
AVINASH DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Princeton 1994); Glenn R.
Hubbard, Investment Under Uncertainty: Keeping One’s Options Open, 32 J. ECON. LIT. 1816 (1994)
(book review). For early foundations, see Andrew B. Abel, Optimal Investment Under Uncertainty, 73
AMER. ECON. REV. 228 (1983); Claude Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The Irreversibility
Effect, 64 AMER. ECON. REV. 1006 (1974). For applications outside of investment theory, see W. Michael
Hanemann, Information and the Concept of Option Value, 16 J. ENVIRON. ECON. MGT. 23 (1989); Robert
McDonald, & Daniel R. Siegel, The Value of Waiting to Invest, 101 Q. J. ECON. 707 (1986). For more
recent developments, see Andrew B. Abel, Avinash K. Dixit, Janice C. Eberly, & Robert S. Pindyk,
Options, the Value of Capital, and Investment, 111 Q. J. ECON. 753 (1996). As applied to the legislature,
see Fracesco Parisi, Vincy Fon, & Neta Ghei, The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, 18 EUR. J. L. & ECON.
131 (2004).
3

A handful of political scientists have worked on issues that implicate timing, but few have focused
explicitly on timing issues. See, e.g., PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME (Princeton 2004); Janet M. BoxSteffensmeier, Laura W. Arnold, & Christopher J.W. Zorn, The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in
Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 324 (1997); Alan
M. Jacobs, Backing into the Future: Reconceiving Policy Reform as Intertemporal Choice (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors, 2007); Amihai Glazer, et al., Strategic Vote Delay in the U. S. House of
Representatives, 20 LEGISLATIVE STUD. Q. 37 (1995). There is also a literature on bureaucratic delay; see,
e.g., Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to Be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political
Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 29 (1999); Lea-Rachel D. Kosnik, Sources of
Bureaucratic Delay: A Case Study of FERC Dam Relicensing, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 258 (2006); Hilary
Sigman, The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and Interest Group Influence, 44 J. L. &
ECON. 315 (2001).
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nearly everything.”4 Some timing rules speed up legislative decision making, while
others slow it down. Some timing rules delay implementation of new law; others dictate
complete and immediate implementation. In this Article, we develop a theory of timing
rules, exploring both the optimal timing of legislative action, and the implications for
attempts to constrain it.
Understanding the dynamics of legislative timing sheds light on the structure of
rules that constrain legal institutions. We do not claim that timing rules are necessarily
the result of intentional efforts to implement law in an optimal fashion, nor do we suggest
that our framework completely describes the set of empirical timing rules observed in
practice. Rather, our goal is to show how timing rules can drive policy, and to use actual
timing rules in legislatures to motivate a theoretical discussion of the optimal timing of
legislation. Timing rules can have both desirable and unfortunate effects on new law.
Different sorts of timing rules can be understood as efforts to calibrate the timing of
legislative consideration, enactment, and implementation of new law. For example, our
theory suggests that timing rules should impose delay in decision-making scenarios
where the incentives of political actors to hurry deviate (for one of a number of possible
reasons that we specify below) from the underlying optimum.
This Article analyzes the effect of timing rules on the nature of new laws. As
such, our work grows out of a tradition in political science and economics that analyzes
the effects of procedural rules on substantive legislative outcomes,5 and more recent
scholarship in law that seeks to explore the foundation of constitutional rules of
procedure.6 Although timing rules may interact with other procedural rules in important
ways,7 the issues that timing rules raise are distinct and sufficiently important to warrant
an independent inquiry.
We propose that timing rules should be analyzed in the context of the principalagent problems that dominate political institutions—where an agent has the authority to
act on behalf of, and for the benefit of, a principal but might not do so because the agent’s
4

Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers,
and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 349 (2003).

5

See, e.g., Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, in LEGISLATURES: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 347 (Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire, & D.
Roderick Kiewiet, eds. 2002); Keith Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules Reconsidered, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 929
(1997); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a
Heterogenous Committee, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459 (1988); Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay,
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, 27
AM J. POL. SCI. 741 (1983); Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, Structure-induced Equilibria and
Perfect-Foresight Expectations, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 762 (1981); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, The
Elusive Median Voter, 12 J. PUB. ECON. 143 (1979); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political
Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1978).
6

Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (2004);
Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145
(1992); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001); John
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A
Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 488 (1995).
7

See infra, Part III.A.
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and the principal’s goals are different. Agency problems dominate relationships between
voters and legislators, Congress as a whole and committee members, and legislators and
the bureaucracy. Timing rules can be understood as a partial response to these agency
problems: timing rules facilitate monitoring of agents by principals and reduce the ability
of ill-motivated agents to make policy decisions that violate the preferences of political
principals. Much of our work then suggests an optimistic story about timing rules. For
example, within the legislature, timing rules may ensure that committees develop relevant
expertise, but also guard against excessive bias in legislation. Outside the legislature,
timing rules can allow a diffuse and disorganized public to combat the influence of
private interest groups on legislation and more carefully monitor legislative behavior.
However, timing rules have a dark side as well. Many timing rules create new agency
problems, generating risk of undesirable behavior by political actors in future periods.
And because many timing rules are chosen by legislators themselves, if legislators are illmotivated, then there is no reason to believe timing rules will always serve the good. We
analyze these negative effects of timing rules as well.
Our thesis then is part positive and part normative. Many of the timing rules we
identify can be given a plausible rationale within our framework. However, there are also
examples of timing mismatch, where the benefits of delay or rapidity demanded by the
timing rule fit poorly with what our theory suggests about the optimal timing of
legislation. Rather than claiming that we can accurately explain why timing rules are
adopted in fact, we offer a partial rational reconstruction of timing rules, emphasizing the
range of effects that timing rules have on politics and legislation. Because these effects
can be either desirable or undesirable in different contexts, our framework is part
normative as well. Although we do not attempt to identify the one right structure of
timing rules, we do identify a series of relevant variables that point towards more delay or
rapidity in lawmaking. We also suggest reasons to prefer regulating legislative behavior
using timing rules rather than using content-based restrictions, and to rely more robustly
on timing rules as mechanisms for improving public policy.
Lest the discussion get too abstract too quickly, to motivate our discussion Part I
begins by assembling a typology of timing rules that constrain the legislature. Part II
develops a theory of the optimal timing of legislation and explains how the theory helps
elucidate the choice of timing rules that constrain the legislature. Part III considers
extensions of our theory, exploring the interaction of timing rules with other procedural
rules, the enforcement of timing rules, the dynamics of timing rules in the retroactivity
debate, and delegation to the bureaucracy.
I. EXAMPLES
Timing rules are specified in the Constitution, statutes, the formal rules of the
Senate and House of Representatives, and the informal norms that constrain legislative
action. The assortment of timing rules in these contexts is diverse, ranging from
seemingly unimportant restrictions on the frequency or occasion for Congressional
meetings, to rules that systematically build delay into the legislative process or force
rapid legislative action. Our discussion here provides a sample, rather than the universe,
of timing rules; it is intended to motivate the analysis rather than describe a complete set
of rules to be explained.
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Timing rules might initially be categorized into four types: Delay Rules, Rapidity
Rules or Deadline Rules, Coordination Rules, and Trigger Rules. Delay Rules forestall
action with the use of direct delay mechanisms. Deadline Rules mandate some action
within a specified time period. Coordination Rules specify when an action is to take
place, where the specific timing is arbitrary but a decisionmaking body would have
difficulty coordinating on its own, for example, a rule of this sort might specify the date
for the first meeting of Congress. Lastly, Trigger Rules use the timing of legislative
action to trigger some other feature of the legislative process. We focus on delay rules
and rapidity rules, but discuss other variants where relevant.
At this point, we should also specify some rough contours of our inquiry. Any
procedural rule can have the effect of generating delay.8 The presentment requirement,
for example, though not a de jure timing rule, will lead to delay, because the President
can rarely sign a bill immediately after its passage. Although we wish to distinguish de
jure timing rules from de facto timing rules, we are skeptical that a hard theoretical line
between the two can be maintained. There is a risk that defining timing rules broadly will
cover virtually all procedural rules, but nonetheless we attempt to draw on both
categories throughout. We also consider the interaction of formal timing rules with other
institutional characteristics—some of which are procedural rules.
A. Constitutional Timing Rules
Many Constitutional Timing Rules are part of a more general class of
Constitutional rules constraining congressional procedure.9 The Constitution contains a
medley of rules that regulate timing explicitly. First, some clauses of the Constitution
specify a deadline by which some action must be taken. Article I, section 2, clause 3 is a
deadline rule, specifying a deadline by which the first census shall be conducted and the
interval at which a new census shall be conducted: “The actual Enumeration shall be
made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
direct.”10
Article I, section 8, clause 12 might be understood as a trigger rule. By mandating
that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use [to raise and support armies] shall be for a
longer Term than two Years,”11 the military appropriations clause necessitates a repeated
8

Although timing rules can increase the costs of enacting legislation, we generally focus on the effect of
timing rules on the legislative process rather than the effect of any rule that increases the costs of enacting
legislation. Timing rules may increase enactment costs and can sometimes be analyzed as a subset of the
class of costly procedural rules. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Judicial Doctrine,
Legislative Enactment Costs, and the “Efficient Breach” of Constitutional Rights (unpublished manuscript
2007); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of Hard Look Review, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 753,
794-800 (2006); Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise,
23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 490-91 (2007).
9

See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
361 (2004).
10

U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3.

11

U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12.
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declaration by the legislature that the appropriation is necessary. By requiring recurrent
action to continue a policy, the clause might enhance public deliberation about, and
monitoring of, legislative policymaking.
Other constitutional rules mix triggers and deadlines. Article I, section 7, clause 2
mandates that “If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its
Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”12 By specifying that after ten days, a bill
passed by both houses of Congress and not yet signed by the President becomes law, the
clause provides a hammer to force Presidential action. Setting aside the pocket veto,
Presidential inaction cannot prevent a duly enacted bill from becoming law.
Article I, section 2, clause 1 might be understood as both a coordination rule, a
deadline rule, and a trigger rule. The clause requires that “The House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors
of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”13 The clause coordinates the
selection of Representatives, triggers public evaluation of legislative performance via
elections, and requires that elections be held by the end of the two year term. The twentyfifth amendment provides a detailed timeline for Presidential succession, and serves both
coordination and trigger interests.14
Another set of constitutional timing rules specifies the time at which future events
will occur in order to avoid the impossibility of a subsequent legislative body specifying
the time of its own meeting (a subset of coordination rules).15 For example, “[t]he
Congress shall assemble at least once every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first
Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different day.”16 The
Constitution also requires that the Executive “shall from time to time give to the
Congress information on the state of the union,”17 but does not specify the exact timing it
is to occur. By modern norm the speech is delivered on the last Tuesday in January, but
the date is not set by law. Some of these rules simply bootstrap the commencement of
political institutions, and though they raise some interesting issues of their own, they are
not the focus of our analysis. Rather, our focus is on timing rules that restrict the
discretion of future political institutions, either generating delay in the legislative process
or increasing the pace of legislative action.

12

U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2.

13

U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 1.

14

U.S. Const. Amend. XXV, sec. 4.

15

Vermeule, supra note 9; Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 549 (1993).

16

U.S. Const., Art. I, sec 4, cl. 2. The clause was subsequently amended by U.S. Const. Amend. XX, § 2
(changing meeting date to January 3).

17

U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 3, cl. 1.
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The requirements that a bill pass both houses of Congress (bicameralism) and be
presented to the President (presentment) impose delay, as noted above.18 So too, the
Origination Clause which requires that all bills for raising revenue originate in the
House,19 at least when measured against a baseline of both houses having proposal
power. These are de facto timing rules. Other constitutional timing rules are absent from
the federal constitution, but present in other constitutions. For example, many state
constitutions regulate the time during which new legislation may be proposed, precluding
the introduction of new bills within a certain number of days of the end of the legislative
session.20 Others require that two separate votes in two successive legislative sessions be
taken in order to amend the constitution.21 These constitutional timing rules are just
illustrations, but they illustrate the diversity of timing rules in constitutions.
B. Statutory Timing Rules
Statutes are another rich source of timing rules.22 For example, the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act requires Congress to schedule a vote on covered trade
agreements with foreign governments within two months, while also prohibiting
amendments.23 “Fast-track” is a rapidity rule, the opposite of a delay rule.
The timetable for legislative action on the federal budget is also specified by
statute. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 sets out a detailed
timetable for the budget process requiring the President to submit his proposed budget
fifteen days after Congress meets, Congress to complete action on bills and resolutions
providing new budget and spending authority by September 15, and Congress to take
final action on reconciliation bills or resolution or both by September 25.25 Although the
timeline provides coordination benefits, the statute is also intended to increase and
routinize the pace of the budget process.
24

The National Emergencies Act authorizes the President to declare a national
emergency. However, it also requires that “each House of Congress shall meet to
consider a vote on a concurrent resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be
18

U.S. Const., Art I. sec. 7.

19

U.S. Const., Art I. sec. 7, cl. 1 (“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.”).

20

See Vermeule, supra note 9.

21

See, e.g., Mass. Const. amend LXXXI. For a survey of amendment procedures in U.S. state constitutions
see ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (2D 2006).

22

On statutory control of subsequent lawmaking process, see generally Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of
Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005); Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion:
The Uses of Laws about Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409 (2001); Bruhl, supra note 4.
23

19 U.S.C. § 2191. The statute specifies the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate, but
does so “with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as
relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the
case of any other rule of that House.” 19 U.S.C. § 2191(a)(2).

24

See 2 U.S.C. § 631.

25

88 Stat. 297, 306 (1974).
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terminated.”26 If a resolution is passed by one House, the statute requires that the
resolution be immediately referred to the appropriate committee of the other House and
be reported out of committee within 15 calendar days unless the House determines
otherwise by yeas and nays.27
Both the Budget Act and the National Emergencies Act provide timing rules in
important policy domains, but other timing statues are more mundane.28 For example, the
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976 outlines elaborate procedures and timing
rules to be followed by Congress once the President makes determinations on Alaskan
natural gas pipelines.29 Similarly, the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of
1976 specifies procedural rules including timing rules for the disapproval of international
fisheries agreements.30 Statutes of this sort have been variously referred to as “framework
legislation”31 or “statutized rules,”32 but regardless of nomenclature, they often contain
timing rules for enacting legislation. Indeed, many of these measures are explicitly
“expedition” statutes, intended to speed up the process of congressional consideration.33
An oddity in these statues is that they often contain a specific statement that each
House maintains the constitutional authority to change its rules at any time. In fact, if this
authority is constitutional than these statues need say nothing about the matter at all:
either House might, at any time, alter its rules. It is an open question whether statutory
restrictions on legislative rules could preclude subsequent alteration without a statutory
amendment. We set this issue aside, noting only that our analysis remains valid so long as
Congress treats statutory timing rules as binding.
C. Internal Timing Rules
Although the federal constitution regulates the timing of legislative action
directly, its most important contribution to timing rules is the rules of proceedings
clause,34 which allows each house to determine its own internal rules of procedure. The
House of Representatives adopts new rules at the commencement of each session by
majority vote; the Senate considers itself a continuing body and the Standing Rules
continue in effect from session to session. Both the House Rules and the Senate Rules
contain an extensive set of provisions on timing. Below we offer a few examples from
each legislative body.
1. Examples
26

90 Stat. 1255, 1256 § 202(b) (1976), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1622.

27

50 U.S.C. § 1622(c)(3).

28

See generally Bruhl, supra note 22, at 346 n. 9 (collecting statutes that specify congressional procedures).

29

90 Stat. 2903 (1976), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 719f.

30

16 U.S.C. § 1823; 90 Stat 340 (1994).

31

Garrett, supra note 22.

32

Bruhl, supra note 4.

33

See generally Tiefer, supra note 22 at 410.

34

U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . . .”).
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Most timing rules in the Senate are contained in Rule XIV on “bills, joint
resolutions, resolutions, and preambles thereto.” Rule XIV.1 specifies that “Whenever a
bill or joint resolution shall be offered, its introduction shall, if objected to, be postponed
for one day.”35 Rule XIV.2 is a three reading rule requiring that every bill and joint
resolution receive three readings prior to passage, which any senator may request be on
three different legislative days.36 Both parts 1 and 2 of Senate Rule XIV are essentially
minority-protecting delay rules. While a minority of one cannot forestall the legislation
forever, a lone Senator, by the terms of the rule, can trigger some delay in the legislative
process.37 Another rule requires that “All reports of committees and motions to discharge
a committee from the consideration of a subject, and all subjects from which a committee
shall be discharged, shall lie over one day for consideration, unless by unanimous consent
the Senate shall otherwise direct.”38 Equivalently, one Senator may require that all bills
being discharged from committee be held for one day.
Senate Rule XVII.3(a) allows for privileged consideration of a motion by the
majority and minority leaders to refer a bill to multiple committees, but not until twentyfour hours after the motion has been printed and made available to Senators in the
Congressional Record.39 Senate Rule XVII.4(a) requires that all “reports of committees
and motions to discharge a committee from the consideration of a subject . . . shall lie
over one day for consideration, unless by unanimous consent the Senate shall otherwise
direct.”40 Rule XXVI governs committee procedure. One provision of the rule allows any
three members of a committee to request a special meeting of the committee. “If, within
three calendar days after the filing of the request, the chairman does not call the requested
special meeting, to be held within seven calendar days after the filing of the request, a
majority of the members of the committee may file in the offices of the committee their
written notice that a special meeting of the committee will be held, specifying the date
and hour of that special meeting. The committee shall meet on that date and hour.”41 The
Rule allows a minority of a committee to trigger a special meeting, after a specified time
period has elapsed. The various Senate Rules sometimes require rapidity in the legislative
process and sometimes impose delay.
Although the Rules of the House of Representatives are adopted at the beginning
of each Congress, in most sessions the House Rules also contain a good number of timing
rules. Consider House Rule XVI governing Motions and Amendments, the parallel to the
Senate’s three reading rule. House Rule XVI requires a full reading when the bill is first
considered,42 a second reading when the bill is read for amendment in a committee of the
35

Senate Rule XIV.1.

36

Senate Rule XIV.2.

37

Senate Rule XIV.

38

Senate Rule XVII.4(a).

39

Senate Rule XVII.3(a).

40

Senate Rule XVII.4(a).

41

Senate Rule XXVI.3.

42

House Rule XVI(a) (“A first reading is in full when the bill or joint resolution is first considered.”).
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Whole House,43 and a third reading before a vote.44 Reading rules serve familiar goals of
notice, but they are also de facto legislative delay rules. Multiple reading rules are timing
rules that impose delay on the legislative process.
House Rule XIII governs House calendars and committee reports. Rule XIII.2
(b)(2) requires that “the report of a committee on a measure that has been approved by
the committee shall be filed within seven calendar days . . . .”45 The rule establishes a
deadline, essentially a rapidity rule. Other portions of the rule impose delay. Rule
XIII.4(a)(1) specifies that “it shall not be in order to consider in the House a measure or
matter reported by a committee until the third calendar day . . . on which each report of a
committee on that measure or matter has been available to Members, Delegates, and the
Resident Commissioner.”46 House Rule XV.1(a) restricts the timing of a motion to
suspend the rules: “A rule may not be suspended except by a vote of two-thirds of the
Members voting, a quorum being present. The Speaker may not entertain a motion that
the House suspend the rules except on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during
the last six days of a session of Congress.”47 Rule XV.2(a) specifies that discharge
motions shall be in order on the second and fourth Mondays of a month. By doing so the
rule imposes some delay in the legislative process, but also coordinates the timing of
motions to discharge. Rule XV.2(b)(1)(B) could be understood as either a delay or
rapidity rule. It allows a motion to discharge “a committee from consideration of a public
bill or public resolution that has been referred to it for 30 legislative days.”48 Like the
Senate Rules, the various timing rules of the House interact to inject delay and rapidity
into the overall legislative process.
2. The Puzzle of Waiver
Unlike constitutional timing rules and arguably statutory timing rules, internal
Congressional timing rules have a puzzling feature: the rules can be waived. For
example, in the Senate, an internal rule can be changed by a supermajority vote,49
suspended by majority vote with notice,50 or suspended by unanimous consent without
43

House Rule XVI(b) (“A second reading occurs only when the bill or joint resolution is read for
amendment in a Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union under clause 5 of rule XVIII.”).

44

House Rule XVI(c) (“A third reading precedes passage when the Speaker states the question: ‘‘Shall the
bill [or joint resolution] be engrossed [when applicable] and read a third time?’’ If that question is decided
in the affirmative, then the bill or joint resolution shall be read the final time by title and then the question
shall be put on its passage.”).

45

House Rule XIII.2(b)(2).

46

House Rule XIII.4(a)(1).

47

House Rule XV.1(a).

48

House Rule XV.2(b)(1)(B).
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And arguably a bare majority, depending on one’s interpretation of the Senate Rules. Various procedural
gambits are surveyed in the commentary on the filibuster. See generally GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC
SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION & LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE (Princeton 2006).
50

Senate Rule V.1 (“No motion to suspend, modify, or amend any rule, or any part thereof, shall be in
order, except on one day’s notice in writing, specifying precisely the rule or part proposed to be suspended,
modified, or amended, and the purpose thereof.”).
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notice.51 If the rule can be waived, how seriously should timing rules be taken as a
restriction on legislative behavior? If legislators always act optimally, then the timing
rule constraint is unnecessary. Legislators would delay when delay is warranted and
speed up when rapidity is warranted. If legislators are ill-motivated, they would not adopt
timing rules in time 0 to constrain themselves in a desirable way at time 1. Presumably,
the ill-motivated legislature would like to maximize its ability to do ill across time
periods. Our account adds little to the literature on this front.52
The waiver concern does not apply to constitutional rules, and there is an open
question about whether statutory rules of procedure can be altered without a subsequent
statute repealing or amending the prior statute. But many timing rules are internal rules,
and the importance of our project would be reduced if timing rules had no binding effect
on legislative behavior.
The conventional wisdom is that internal rules are important and often
constraining.53 This should be no more or less true for timing rules than other rules. In
part, this is because waiver can be costly either because of reputation or because of voting
rules. If members of a legislature believe that timing rules provide general benefits,
legislators may refrain from waiving timing rules to facilitate enactment of a specific
piece of legislation. If respect for the rules emerges as a historical norm, concern for a
legislator’s reputation may make the rules binding in practice though waivable in theory.
Waiving the Senate Rules formally requires either one day’s notice or unanimous
consent.54 Either some additional delay is required, in which case the primary delay rule
is only partially avoided, or unanimity is required, which may be difficult to assemble.
The degree of constraint imposed by internal timing rules is a function of the cost of
waiver, which is a function of voting rules.
We assume that a rational legislature at time 0 might adopt some constraints on its
behavior in time 1. Slowing down certain classes of decisions to avoid certain forms of
political pressure is a stock justification for procedural hurdles in Congress and

51

Senate Rule V.1 (“Any rule may be suspended without notice by the unanimous consent of the Senate,
except as otherwise provided by the rules.”).

52

These questions are addressed by the literature on self-commitment. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000)
53

Compare the debate surrounding the “nuclear option” controversy in which the Senate rules would be
altered by simple majority vote to avoid filibusters of judicial nominations. See, e.g., David S. Law &
Lawrence B. Solum, Positive Political Theory and the Law: Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and
the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51(2006). Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In
Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nominations, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2005); Catherine Fisk & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543 (2005).

54

Senate Rule V.1 (“No motion to suspend, modify, or amend any rule, or any part thereof, shall be in
order, except on one day's notice in writing, specifying precisely the rule or part proposed to be suspended,
modified, or amended, and the purpose thereof. Any rule may be suspended without notice by the
unanimous consent of the Senate, except as otherwise provided by the rules.”).
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delegation to bureaucratic institutions.55 If legislatures use timing rules to structure
deliberations, the effects of timing rules should be properly understood. This framing
sidesteps the positive puzzle about waiver in a somewhat unsatisfying way, but not in a
way that is unique to our work.
II. THEORY
We now provide a framework for understanding timing rules. First, we explain
the costs and benefits of delaying legislative action. Second, we explain the effects of
timing rules on Congress’s incentives to delay or speed up legislative action. Third, we
address what we call “internal” reasons for why Congress would want to constrain itself
with timing rules—namely, to solve internal problems of cooperation among the
members of Congress. Fourth, we address “external” reasons for timing rules as solutions
to agency problems between Congress and the public. Although, for expository
simplicity, we will focus on Congress, much of what we say applies to other government
actors as well, as we will discuss in Part III.56 Our theoretical discussion can be applied to
many, but not all, of the empirical instances of timing rules highlighted above. The match
between the general theoretical concerns emphasized in Part II and illustrations used to
motivate the discussion is reasonably strong, but also clearly imperfect.
A. Optimal Timing in Light of Uncertainty
Suppose that Congress believes that certain legislation would create a public good
worth B at a cost of C, where B>C.57 The legislation could create the public good in
period 1, period 2, or period 3. (Period 3 becomes relevant only when we address delay
rules in Part B.) The cost is incurred at the same time as the benefit is created and the
legislation lasts for one period. As time passes, additional information about the potential
effects of the legislation is revealed: in particular, at the start of period 2 it is revealed
whether B>C. Enacting a law incurs legislative costs, k, which might vary across periods,
depending on how busy Congress is. Finally, we assume that if the creation of the public
good is deferred, people may adjust their behavior during period 1. This may either
reduce the costs C or equivalently increase the benefits B of the legislation. For
55

Roger G. Noll & James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 747, 774–75 (1990); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 593 (2002). The independent central bank is the
classic example of insulation of government decisions from political pressure. As others have noted,
political insulation of this sort may be entirely rational. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Time to
Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1345 (1982); Finn E. Kydland & Edward C.
Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POLIT. ECON. 473 (1977).
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One potential ambiguity in our analysis concerns the relationship between what might be called
“legislative time” and “real-world time.” Many of the rules we identify impose significant delay within the
legislature, but trivial delay outside the literature. For example, a rule requiring a delay of three legislative
days imposes trivial delay in the real world. However, within the legislature where the legislative agenda is
often overflowing, a delay of three legislative days may be extremely significant. We reference this
distinction occasionally in our model and discussion. For the most part, the distinction is allowed to remain
implicit.

57

Although we emphasize public goods for purposes of discussion, there is nothing in our model that
requires the legislation be for public goods rather than private goods.
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simplicity, we focus on the cost side. To distinguish cases when people can and cannot
adjust, we will refer to CH and CL, where CH>CL. If people can adjust, then the cost is
only CL; if they cannot adjust, the cost is CH.
Congress has a choice: it can pass the law in period 1, to go into effect the same
period; or it can wait and pass the law in period 2, to go into effect in period 2.If
Congress passes the law in period 1, then the benefit B will be created with probability p
(while the cost, C, is certain); otherwise it will produce a benefit of (say) 0. Thus, acting
quickly creates a risk that a law will produce no benefit, but it allows the public to enjoy
the benefit of the public good immediately if it turns out that the benefit is created.
If Congress waits until period 2, then it will pass the law only if it turns out that
B>C. Thus, Congress avoids the risk that it will incur legislative costs, k, to enact a law
that produces costs and no benefits. Further, it enables regulated individuals to adjust,
and so incur CL rather than CH. The disadvantage of waiting is that the public benefit, if
it is realized, occurs later rather than sooner.
Note that a “period” is not meant to refer to a specific unit of time such as a year
or a legislative session. The term is kept abstract and its meaning depends on the context
to which the framework is applied. Such abstraction is necessitated also by the ambiguity
of the effects of timing rules, which we will address below. Some rules effect delay of
just a day or two, but given the demands on Congress’s time, the practical effect of such
rules could be much greater.
To fix intuitions, consider an example. The public good is cleaner air; the benefit
consists of aesthetic and health benefits; the cost consists of the cost of installing
scrubbers for smokestacks. Relevant meteorological conditions will not be determined
until period 2. With probability 1-p, the scrubbers will do no good (because they turn out
to eliminate particles that blow elsewhere and to have no effect on particles that remain
within the area). If the public good is created in period 2, factory owners can adjust by
installing scrubbers while smokestacks are already under construction or being repaired;
if the public good is created in period 1, they cannot adjust in this way, but instead must
take special steps to install the scrubbers.
The two main alternatives are as follows.
Immediate legislation. Congress enacts a law that creates the public good in
period 1, to take effect in period 1. The benefit B is created with probability p, while the
cost CH of creating the public good and the legislative costs, k, are certain. Thus, the
value of the action is pB-CH-k.
Deferred legislation. Congress waits and then passes the law in period 2 if and
only if the public good has positive value of B. Now the benefit B and the cost CL (low
cost because people have a chance to adjust, assuming they can anticipate deferred
legislation) are incurred with probability p, as is the legislative cost. However, because of
delay, the value of the action must be discounted by discount factor d, where d < 1. Thus,
the value of deferred legislation is dp(B-CL-k).
It is clear and intuitive that immediate legislation dominates deferred legislation
when the probability that B will be created is high, the cost of creating the public good is
low, adjustment costs are low, legislative enactment costs are low, and discounting is
12
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great. In our example, Congress should pass immediate legislation if it is highly likely
that the scrubbers will clean the air (so further study adds little information), it is only a
little cheaper to install scrubbers earlier rather than later (because there is no construction
or repair going on), the particular environmental legislation is simple and cheaply
enacted, and people value present benefits greatly over future benefits.58
Now consider a third and fourth alternative.
Anticipatory legislation. Congress passes the law in period 1, to take effect in
period 2.59 The legislative costs, k, are incurred with certainty and without discounting;
the public good is discounted and probabilistic. Thus, the value of anticipatory legislation
is d[pB-CL]-k. However, if B=0, Congress will repeal the statute at period 2 (if the costs
of repeal are less than CL) rather than incur the loss of CL, so the actual value would be:
d[p(B-CL)-(1-p)k]-k.
Conditional legislation. Congress passes a law in period 1 that provides that the
public good will be created in period 2 if and only if it has positive value of B. The value
of this action is d[p(B-CL)]-k. The cost of repeal is avoided.60
Against the baseline of deferred legislation, one advantage of anticipatory
legislation is that the legislative costs are incurred at period 1 rather than period 2.
Normally it would be better to put off legislative costs (if they are discounted), but
Congress might anticipate that legislative costs will be higher in period 2—because it will
be busier or because political conditions will change. If p is very high, then anticipatory
legislation could also be optimal for legislators. Another advantage of anticipatory
legislation, albeit not shown in our notation, is that adjustment costs should be lower
because citizens can more confidently rely on the public good being created. If
anticipatory legislation is used, the public good will be created unless Congress repeals
the law in period 2. If deferred legislation is used, the public good is created only if
Congress finally acts in period 2. Because legislative action is more difficult and costly
than inaction, anticipatory legislation increases the probability that the public good will
be created at the time that citizens adjust. The probability of the public good being
created in time 2 is a relevant variable for anticipatory, conditional, and deferred
legislation. In our model, it is irrelevant to immediate legislation because the costs and
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To the extent that legislation creates irreversibilities, immediate legislation also sacrifices option value.
See Parisi, et al., supra note 2.
59

See, e.g., International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994), codified at
15 U.S.C. §6210) (imposing reporting requirements on the Attorney General beginning three years after the
date of enactment); Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 2341, 2369 (2004)
(deferring implementation of Act for six months); Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
of 2004, codified at 20 U.S.C. 1408(b) (imposing enhanced reporting requirements on the Secretary of
Education two years after enactment); 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(3)(C) (Clean Air Act) (deferring applicability of
regulations to a time no earlier than the model year commencing four years after such revised standard is
promulgated).
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See e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, 102 Stat. 2654,
2672-73 (1988), codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136q(f) (stripping sates of authority to exercise enforcement
responsibility pursuant to Act after five years unless the Administrator determines that state is adequately
complying with other provisions of the statute).
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benefits are realized entirely in period 1. If legislation distributed costs and benefits
across time periods, the probability of repeal would be relevant to immediate legislation
as well.
Generally, Congress would prefer conditional legislation to anticipatory
legislation, as the former avoids the cost, CL, in period 2, with probability 1-p. The main
problem with conditional legislation is that some decisionmaker—a judge, an agency, the
President—must determine whether the conditions are met in period 2, and the
decisionmaker might act dishonestly or opportunistically or simply erroneously. And if
citizens expect that the decisionmaker will make the wrong decision in period 2, they will
not adjust properly in period 1.
Going back to our example, Congress might pass an anticipatory law in period 1
that provides for the installation of the scrubbers in period 2. A conditional law passed in
period 1 would provide that a decisionmaker—say, the Environmental Protection
Agency—will order the installation of the scrubbers in period 2 if it finds that that the
meteorological conditions so warrant. As noted, anticipatory legislation would encourage
regulated parties to adjust, but can result in bad law in period 2—or else requires
Congress to act a second time and repeal the law. The conditional law avoids this
outcome but at the risk of a bad or costly decision by the EPA.
Although the ideal types of legislation—immediate, anticipatory, deferred, and
conditional—can be well-specified in theory, in any given case it may be unclear how to
categorize a particular statute. Consider the Patriot Act.61 Many of its provisions gave law
enforcement agencies powers that they had long believed necessary. On this backwardlooking view, the Patriot Act was deferred legislation. But some of its provisions were,
according to its critics, unnecessary given the uncertain level of threat post-9/11, though
they could conceivably be necessary if the level of threat turned out to be high enough.
On this view, those provisions of the Patriot Act were immediate legislation.
This ambiguity notwithstanding, the four types of legislation can be readily
identified in the political landscape. Anticipatory legislation is common: many enacted
statutes delay implementation until some specified future date—usually the start of the
new calendar year. Other statutes phase in or phase out benefits or costs over several time
periods. That Congress is uncertain that the anticipatory legislation will actually create
the public good is revealed by the telltale sunset clause, which provides for the automatic
repeal of the statute, suggesting that Congress is not sure that the legislation will be
beneficial.62 Deferred legislation is also common. Waiting for future study is the norm in
61

USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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This practice has an early genesis in the United States. In the First Congress, one debate centered on
whether the Impost Act should contain a sunset provision, with Madison’s proposal to include a sunset
ultimately winning. At least one representative, Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina, thought that
virtually all statutes should contain sunsets. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 541 (2003) (quoting Tucker on his view that nothing could justify a perpetual law except
“circumstances which would render a law equally necessary now, and on all future occasions”). Early
bankruptcy statutes were similar. See Statute of 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1732) (incorporating the Statute of 4 Anne,
ch 17). See also Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 325, 333 n. 47 (1991); Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to
the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 156 (1982) (explaining that the 1705
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legislative decisionmaking. Immediate legislation occurs most often during crises and
emergencies. Conditional legislation is common but typically takes the form of legislative
delegations to the executive branch.63 A statute says that if certain conditions are met,
then the President may or must take certain actions.64
We have ignored numerous complications, one of the most important being
statutes that create costs and benefits in different periods. For example, appropriating
funds for the construction of a bridge incurs costs in period 1, when the tax bite is felt, for
benefits in period 2, when the bridge is finished and can be used. Conversely, incurring
debt in order to lower taxes creates a benefit for period 1, when taxpayers have more
funds at their disposal, and a cost for period 2, when the debt must be repaid with interest.
Costs and benefits can also be spread out in more complex ways across periods. It is
important to keep these complications in mind, but we will ignore them in order to keep
the analysis simple and because they do not detract from our main arguments.
Another complication we have ignored is the importance of partisan differences in
determining when legislation is enacted. From the public’s view, it might be optimal for a
particular law to be enacted soon, and everyone might agree with this. Nonetheless, the
minority in a legislature might hope to delay enactment until after the next election,
which could result in the minority party becoming the majority party—or other
advantages such as a new president who belongs to the minority party. If delay can be
achieved, the law might be passed after an amendment that favors the minority party in
some way. Another advantage of delay is that delay could deprive the majority party of a
legislative success that would improve its chances at the election—unless, of course, the
majority party can successfully blame the minority party for delay. All in all, it is a
striking feature of the delay rules that they favor the minority group by giving them tools
for pushing legislation off into a potentially sunnier political future. But in this way,
delay rules are quite similar to supermajority rules, which have the same effect, and are
extensively analyzed elsewhere.65
Act, “like much legislation of the time, contained a ‘sunset’ provision”). Sunsets, of course, might be used
for reasons other than uncertainty about benefits as well. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007).
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See, e.g., section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, which requires the Federal
Communications Commission to review all of its regulations applicable to providers of telecommunications
services in every even-numbered year, beginning in 1998, to determine whether the regulations are no
longer in the public interest due to meaningful economic competition between providers of the service, and
whether such regulations should be repealed or modified. 47 U.S.C § 161 (2000). That is, the FCC is to
regulate, conditional on the existence of inadequate competition in the telecommunications industry.
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See, e.g., the various conditional laws discussed in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691-92
(1892). The Act of June 4, 1794 gave the President the authority to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels
in the ports of the United States “whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require.” 1 Stat. 372
1794). The Act of March 6, 1866 gave the President authority to declare a prior statute inoperative
“whenever in his judgement [the importation of neat cattle and the hides of neat cattle] may be made
without danger of the introduction of spread of contagious or infectious disease among the cattle of the
United States.” 14 Stat. 4 (1866).
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See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of
the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules
as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999); Timothy Groseclose & James M.
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So far we have suggested that Congress has good reasons for choosing one of the
four temporal types of legislation. Timing allows Congress to economize on legislative
costs, address problems quickly or enable citizens to adjust, and handle uncertainty about
the effects of a legislative proposal.66 But if Congress has the right incentives to time
legislation, it would not need to be regulated by the rules described in Part I. Thus, we
now turn to the question of why Congress might time legislation poorly, and whether
these rules provide Congress better incentives. We also address the possibility that the
rules themselves make things worse.
B. The Effect of Delay and Rapidity Rules
Suppose that the delay rules we discussed in Part I have the following effect. If
Congress seeks to legislate for period i, it must begin deliberating in period i-1. The rules
thus preclude immediate legislation: Congress can legislate only for period 2 in our
schema. Deferred legislation means that Congress deliberates in period 1 but enacts for
period 2.
As noted above, any particular delay rule might specify delay of just a day or two;
others, real or hypothetical, might require a delay of a longer period. Moreover, the effect
of an apparently modest delay of a few days may be quite significant within the
legislature, where time and agenda resources are scarce. Also, the cumulative effect of
many different rules could be to cause considerable delay or limited delay.
Anticipatory and conditional legislation must be understood in a special way. If
Congress must deliberate in period 1 in order to enact a statute in period 2, but then
enacts anticipatory or conditional legislation, then those types of legislation go into effect
only in period 3. More formally, if Congress seeks to legislate for period i, it must begin
deliberating in period i-2, so that it can pass anticipatory or conditional legislation in
period i-1, which takes effect in period i.
The delay rules have two opposing effects. At first sight, they would only seem to
increase the probability of deferred legislation. If Congress cannot enact for period i, then
it must enact for period i+1. If Congress believes that anticipatory or conditional
legislation is warranted, it must deliberate in period i, enact for period i+1, and then wait
until period i+2 for the law to take effect. This means that the benefits of the law are
discounted twice from the perspective of period i. Deferred legislation, where discounting
occurs only once, thus seems comparatively attractive.
Yet the delay rules can also increase the probability of anticipatory and
conditional legislation. If Congress anticipates that it cannot enact for a certain period
after a problem arises, because of the delay rules, it will act earlier to address this risk
and, if necessary, delegate power to other decisionmakers who can act more quickly.

Snyder, Buying Supermajorities, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303 (1996); Edward P. Schwartz & Warren
Schwartz, Decisionmaking by Juries Under Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 775
(1992).
66

In some circumstances, delay could conceivably increase the costs of implementation if regulated parties
engage in strategic behavior to try to raise implementation costs in the hopes of avoiding subsequent
implementation.
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Delay rules cause delay only in the first case; but they can also cause Congress to act
quickly, in anticipation of problems, so as to avoid being forced to delay when problems
arise.
Which effect will predominate? As we have noted, deferred legislation is more
attractive than anticipatory legislation if legislative costs are high, the importance of
adjustment is low, and the probability that the public good will be valuable is low.
Anticipatory legislation is more attractive than conditional legislation if the agency costs
from delegating to another decisionmaker are high.
Consider again our example. If we imagine that Congress first learns of the
negative health effects of the pollution in period 1, then delay rules mean that it cannot
enact immediate legislation. Deferred legislation enables the law to go into effect in
period 2, so that the benefits are discounted only once. If, instead, Congress enacted
anticipatory or conditional legislation, so as to allow parties to adjust, the benefits will
not be felt until period 3.
But in a more general sense Congress will realize at any given time that a new
problem might arise in a future period. It knows that the delay rules will prevent it from
addressing that problem immediately. So if it anticipates that pollution might be the
source of future problems, it might, instead of waiting for the problem to arise, enact
conditional legislation or even highly general anticipatory legislation. Conditional
legislation delegates to the EPA, which then can respond quickly to the problem if
necessary.
Rapidity rules can be similarly understood. If a rapidity rule is in place, then
Congress must address a problem with immediate legislation; deferred, conditional, and
anticipatory legislation are off the table. Thus, rapidity rules force Congress to act
quickly when it might otherwise be inclined to delay. There is also the possible contrary
effect: once a rapidity rule is in place, Congress might respond by enacting anticipatory
or conditional legislation so that it will not subsequently be rushed into making a
decision.
C. Internal Reasons for Regulating Timing
Congress is a collective body, and is subject to the pathologies of collective
action. Over the years, Congress has developed various rules, norms, and practices that,
on the most optimistic account, overcome the problems of collective action and enable
Congress to enact desirable laws. One hypothesis, then, is that delay rules are one way
that Congress structures internal decisionmaking to avoid the pathologies of collective
choice.
1. Passion and Delay
The usual explanation for delay rules like the three-reading rule is that Congress
wants to constrain itself from acting out of temporary passion, and that the costs of bad
legislation caused by passion are less than the benefits that are lost as a result of the
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constraint on quick action.67 Because passion-induced law is more likely to be bad law, it
is better to risk congressional inaction than to allow Congress to act quickly.
This conventional wisdom has seriously difficulties. First, the types of stimulus
that rouse Congress out of its stupor are just those types of problems that need quick
congressional action. An emergency occurs: passion might interfere with rational
legislative deliberation but careful deliberation is not desirable if time is of the essence. It
is perverse to demand that the government come to a halt precisely when rapid
governmental action is most needed.68
Second, passion can provide needed motivation. The usual account of Congress
stresses inertia rather than excessive action. To act, Congress must overcome a collective
action problem, plus an effective supermajority rule. Congressional procedure is filled
with hurdles that must be successively cleared to enact legislation. This means that the
median voter will usually not have his or her way. Emotion is motivational, and passion
might be just what is needed to overcome inertia caused by the individual rationality of
members of Congress. If, as a collective body, Congress enacts desirable legislation too
infrequently, delay rules that raise the costs of immediate action further exacerbate
undesirable institutional tendencies.
Third, it is just when Congress is most roused to passion that timing rules are least
likely to constrain it. An impassioned Congress will waive internal rules and use clear
statements in order to overcome interpretive presumptions imposed by the courts. The
importance of maintaining internal rules on timing and otherwise will be most visible to
Congress when it is in a deliberative rather than passionate state.69
Fourth, Congress itself often addresses future emergencies and other passioninducing events by enacting conditional legislation during times of calm. Conditional
legislation allows the executive to act without first obtaining legislative permission. The
fact that something is being done by the government will reduce the pressure on Congress
to act immediately. To the extent that passions temporarily addle congressional
deliberation, the incentive to act immediately will at least be reduced.
2. Group Polarization and Delay
Despite these problems, the notion that delay rules enable people to overcome or
mitigate deliberative pathologies retains a strong hold on intuition, and clearly underlies
other areas of law, such as cooling-off laws that allow consumers to void contracts
entered into under pressure.70 Perhaps, the overall intuition is correct but the mechanism
67

See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 364
(2004); JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS (M. James, C. Blamires, & C. Pease-Watkin, eds. 1999).
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See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, TERROR
COURTS 61-64 (2007).
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Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman On Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
631, 640-49 (2006).
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See generally Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 730, 774 (1989); Caroline O. Shoenberger, Consumer Myths v. Legal Realities: How Can Businesses
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has not been adequately identified; perhaps, for example, delay rules can weaken the
effects of group polarization and other phenomena caused by cognitive biases.
Group polarization refers to the empirically validated tendency of groups of likeminded people to make collective decisions that are more extreme than the decisions to
which the group members would come if they voted independently.71 The phenomenon
might not, at first sight, appear to be applicable to Congress, whose members are
relatively heterogeneous, but it could certainly apply to some judgments of Congress,
especially when decisions are initially made by a caucus of the majority party. One
conjecture, then, is that delay rules could be a way of weakening the ill effects of group
polarization and other decisionmaking pathologies.
The question is what the mechanism of group polarization is, and whether delay
rules would throw sand into it. Unfortunately, the mechanism is not well understood. One
possibility draws on the idea of social comparison: people want to be perceived favorably
by other members of a group, and they are perceived favorably if they share other group
members’ views.72 The common desire for the favorable perceptions of others should
create a feedback mechanism that drives people to the extreme. If so, it is hard to see how
requiring delay prior to decision would improve outcomes. Instead, during the period of
delay, people might have more time to bring their own views into alignment with the
views of others. As Cass Sunstein notes, people who deliberate among themselves for a
longer period of time might actually polarize to a greater extent.73 Perhaps, in this context
a rapidity rule would be better, as it might force people to express their opinions before
they have a chance to develop a confident sense of what the opinions of other people in
the group are.
Group polarization can also occur through information pooling, which has been
modeled using the assumption of rational actors rather than cognitively biased actors.
“Information cascades” occur when individuals within a group imitate the expressed
opinions of earlier speakers rather than express their own opinions because they
rationally assume that those earlier opinions, when consistent, reflect more aggregate
information than what they have individually, but with the result that less information (in
the aggregate) is brought to bear on the decision than if people did not cascade.74
Cascades provide a stronger case for delay rules than social comparison does because of a
key fact about information pooling: cascades are fragile because they are vulnerable to
small external shocks such as the disclosure of additional information through public
processes. A delay rule, then, prevents the cascading members of Congress from acting
and during this period of suspended action an external shock—information that comes
out from the media or that is supplied by interest groups—could break the cascade.
provides for a three day cooling off period for door to door sales. 6 C.F.R. 429 (2004). The Federal Truth In
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Whether this case for delay rules is plausible is hard to say. Information cascades
are not well understood, and any benefit must be weighed against the cost—namely the
delay in the enactment of a law that turns out to be desirable.
3. Agenda-Setting and Delay
Another explanation is that delay weakens the agenda-setting power of agents in
Congress who control the legislative process. Congressional officials, including leaders
and committee chairs, are given agenda-setting power for various reasons.75 One
influential theory suggests that, by delegating power to committee chairs, Congress gives
them an incentive to invest in expertise, since committee members also have greater
control of legislative outcomes, and thus can obtain extra rents that justify the
investment.76 On this theory, legislative outcomes will be biased in favor of the interests
of the committee chairs, but they will be better for Congress as a whole (since a majority
must approve the legislation) than they would be if no one invested in the relevant
expertise. The theory thus depends on a delicate tradeoff: one must give the officials
some agenda-setting control (so they invest in expertise) but not too much (or legislative
outcomes will be excessively biased).77
An advantage of delay rules is that they give other members of Congress a chance
to evaluate bills coming out of committee, and to organize opposition to those bills if they
conclude that they are not generally beneficial. To avoid such opposition, committee
chairs will draft bills that are less biased in favor of their own interests. Too much bias
will generate too much opposition.
One might argue that delay rules do no more than reduce the agenda-setting
power of committee chairs, and thus could undermine the reason for delegating to
committees in the first place—to provide committee members with an incentive to
specialize and develop expertise.78 This is partly true, but the peculiar benefit of the delay
75
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rule—which distinguishes it from other rules that could be used to reduce agenda-setting
power such as supermajority rules—is that it encourages informed opposition by
members of Congress who can use extra time to obtain information. Committees will
specialize less only to the extent that Congress exploits delay to inform itself more.
Delay rules have another advantage: they extend the time horizons of committee
members by encouraging them to pass legislation that will have an effect only after they
leave the committee. To the extent that members of committees might leave the
committee in future terms and join other committees, they are more likely to take account
of the general interest of Congress rather than their own narrow interest. Suppose, for
example, that the chair of an agriculture committee wants to please farmers, but knows
that because of delay rules, he can only push through bills that take effect next year and
beyond, at which point he might be a member of the armed forces committee, when he
depends less on the good will of farmers. Along this dimension, the impact of delay rules
might change as a function of other congressional rules that allocate committee chairs.
Chairmanships could be allocated either by seniority or on a rotating basis. Allocation by
seniority creates an incentive for legislators to stay on committees rather than move from
one committee to another. Allocation by rotation makes it more likely that committee
membership will change from time to time. Delay rules might extend the time horizons of
committee chairs in the seniority system but would not improve their incentives to take
account of Congress’s general interest. They could have that effect in the rotation system.
D. External Reasons for Regulating Timing
External reasons refer to a different agency relationship—that between Congress
and the public. The public elects Congress to pass legislation to serve the public’s
interests, but for familiar reasons Congress might not do so. One reason is that interest
groups are more organized than the general public, and thus they can better monitor
members of Congress, and reward them (with campaign contributions and other
assistance) if members of Congress enact laws that benefit interest groups at the expense
of the public.79 Another reason is that members of Congress might have private
ideological or careerist goals (such as reelection) that leads them to prefer legislation that
benefits themselves at the expense of the public. Members of Congress have an interest,
for example, in entrenching themselves by passing legislation that gives them electoral
advantages—franking privileges, and the like.
Timing rules could have two different functions. First, they might reduce these
agency costs: timing rules are a partial solution to a central problem of democratic
governance. Second, they might simply reflect these agency problems: that is, timing
rules reflect the efforts of members of Congress to help interest groups or otherwise serve

that don’t want to see it expire. So, that’s our agenda and it’s big.”). See also Jack L. Walker, Setting the
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elected officials’ private interests in vindicating ideological preferences or ensuring
reelection.
1. Timing Rules as Solutions
One possible role of delay rules is that of reducing the advantages of interest
groups in the legislative process. Suppose that when problems reach the attention of elites
and the public generally, it takes some time for affected groups to mobilize resources to
influence Congress. Suppose further that organized interest groups mobilize resources
more quickly than ordinary citizens, because organized interests maintain institutions and
staffs that monitor events and react quickly.80 Interest groups will lobby Congress to act
quickly before the general public can be mobilized in ad hoc style by political
entrepreneurs. Once Congress legislates, the public will face a high barrier for obtaining
its desired reform. If all this is true, then rules that require delay between when a problem
is identified and when legislation may be enacted will weaken the relative power of
interest groups, and thus increase the probability that publicly spirited legislation will be
enacted.81 The rule affects the content of the legislation by affecting the timing of the
legislation, and it does so in a desirable way if the influence of the general public
naturally lags that of interest groups.82
This point can be extended and made more general. Suppose, a delay rule failed to
alter the eventual influence of interest groups over the content of a specific piece of
legislation. Delay nonetheless may raise the probability of public awareness that such
legislation has been enacted. If the public sanctions legislators for enacting private
interest legislation, legislative responsiveness to private interest groups should lessen in
the long term. The electoral sanction is crude because judgments about legislative
performance on many dimensions must be aggregated into a single yes-no vote. Still, the
threat of electoral sanctions seems to have some effect on legislative behavior. This longterm effect is more likely when delay rules are accompanied by transparency rules, as
they often are within the legislature. Three reading rules might be understood in this way,
both slowing the legislative process and raising the costs of secret legislative action. This
effect is prominent when delay rules are paired with sub-majority triggers. For example,
Senate Rule XIV.2 requires that the three readings of a proposed bill be on different
calendar days, generating delay with an extremely low trigger threshold (a single
legislator).
It is also possible that timing rules affect the price interest groups are willing to
pay for legislation. Suppose, for example, that a delay rule prohibits immediate
legislation. An interest group knows that an issue it cares about might arise at any period
i, but it does not know when that will occur. Because of the delay rule, it cannot force
80
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Congress to pass a law in period i. If it waits until period i, and then acts, it can obtain the
law for period i+1, but the benefits will be discounted, so the law might not be worth the
lobbying costs. If the group instead acts prior to i by encouraging Congress to enact
anticipatory or conditional legislation, it faces further costs. Because the problem is not
yet known, anticipatory legislation will need to be very broad, which means that other
interest groups might object, and so passage will be more difficult. When anticipatory
legislation is used, there is also a risk that a legislature in period i+1 will defect from the
original deal and repeal the legislation.83 Conditional legislation introduces another
decisionmaker, such as an agency, which might not take the interest group’s view. Thus,
the interest group will have to expend additional effort trying to influence the agency,
reducing the value of the initial legislation. In all these ways, timing rules might make
legislation less attractive to interest groups, though it is important to emphasize that it
could also make public spirited legislation less effective as well.
A related possibility is that delay rules uniquely hinder interest groups, creating a
screen that blocks at least some bad laws but lets through public spirited laws. Suppose
that bad laws require lobbying by interest groups. Lobbying typically takes a lot of
money, with big lobbying investments taking place in advance of passage of the bill. And
suppose, by contrast, that good laws are not generally the result of lobbying or influence
by the public, but instead are initiated by members of Congress who want to improve
their chances for reelection by improving the economy, security, and other things that
people care about. Delay rules have the effect of increasing the spread of time between
the lobbying investment and the legislative return, thus reducing the rate of return on the
lobbying effort. By contrast, delay rules should have no similar effect on publicly spirited
bills. If there is no ex ante lobbying investment, delay cannot reduce the value of that
investment.
We should add that the pure form of deferred legislation, whether or not
compelled by strong delay rules, is a species of veil of ignorance rules.84 A veil of
ignorance rule is “a rule that suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of
decisionmakers; it does so by subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the
distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision.”85 One way of doing
so is imposing delay or deferred implementation.86 In their strongest form, delay rules
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have a veil-like effect. Deferred legislation requires enacting legislation in period i that
will not distribute benefits until period i+j. When the interim period is long, individuals
may not know in period i what their position will be in period i+j. Veil rules may thus
directly affect the motivation of legislators in desirable ways, making it more difficult to
make decisions on the basis of narrow self interest.87 Alternatively, the delay subset of
veil rules may also facilitate good legislative behavior by making it easier for the public
to monitor legislators and easier for members of Congress to monitor committee
members. These desirable effects result from delay’s impact on agency problems, rather
than by draping a veil between legislators and the effects of legislation.
2. Timing Rules as Problems
Timing rules help mitigate certain agency problems in politics, but they also
create new ones. Suppose that only interest groups monitor Congress and the public is
largely passive. Delay rules might be a way of ensuring that interest groups have an
opportunity to learn about, and influence, developments in the legislative process.
Congress might fear that if it acts too quickly, interest groups that do not have a chance to
provide input will be unhappy with the results. Delay rules slow down legislation so that
interest groups can have influence. Perhaps some of these groups will have a desirable
influence, but public choice provides many reasons to think otherwise.88 While delay has
the appearance of generating desirable deliberative benefits in Congress, the reality is
darker. Delay simply generates greater opportunities for negative influence by private
interests or rent-extraction by legislators. Moreover, because delay rules facilitate
monitoring, delay makes it easier for interest groups to monitor legislators as well as the
public. Rapidity rules have a dark side as well. Forcing rapid legislative action may
generate errors in policy, reduce transparency, undermine monitoring, make back-room
legislative deals easier, and so on. If delay generally helps mitigate agency problems,
then rapidity is likely to exacerbate them. Timing rules might serve the negative interests
of legislators or private groups.
This view has plausibility in some policy domains, but it is a bit too crude to
describe timing rules in general. First, a now-conventional view is that legislation
involves many variants. Different sorts of legislation generate different distributions of
costs and benefits to private actors.89 Environmental legislation produces concentrated
costs on industry and diffuse benefits to the public. Tax policy often pits concentrated
interest against concentrated interest. The underlying interest group dynamics will vary
across different policy areas and the effects of timing rules will vary accordingly. If, on a
theory of the optimal timing of legislative action delay is bad in a specific policy domain,
a natural suggestion is that rapidity rules are good.
The difficulty is that timing rules can be manipulated to serve either good or bad
ends. If timing rules affect the nature of legislation, timing can be manipulated to make
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policy worse instead of better. This concern is legitimate, but it is no more legitimate
with respect to timing rules than most of features of political institutions. Transparency is
often democratically desirable, but too much transparency in the wrong circumstances
(e.g. national security) can be harmful. Closed rules, which prohibit amendments to
pending legislation, can be used to prevent nongermane amendments on other topics or
amendments that weaken the bill, but they can also be used to avoid amendments that
would fix or strengthen the bill. Timing rules are similar in this respect; they can be used
for good or for ill. The design task is to calibrate timing rules to the specific context. This
task is not easy, but our analysis suggests it is important.

III. EXTENSIONS
A. The Relationship Between Timing Rules and Other Procedural Rules
Timing rules compose a portion of a larger class of procedural rules, rules that
determine how a decisionmaker comes to a decision but not what the content of that
decision is. Constitutional procedural rules, for example, provide that bills become law
only if majorities in both houses vote in favor of them, or two thirds if the President
exercises the veto. Statutory procedural rules like those contained in the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974,90 establish detailed procedural requirements with
deadlines for the specification of a congressionally proposed budget.91 The timeline is
accompanied by procedural restrictions, for example, precluding nongermane amendment
(otherwise permitted) in the Senate,92 or making it out of order to increase spending
beyond that authorized in the concurrent budget resolution.93 Internal procedural rules
include the filibuster rules, and other rules that govern the order in which a chamber does
business, who gets the floor, what type of majority is needed to approve a motion, and so
forth.
The relationship between timing rules and the other types of procedural rules is
complex. An initial source of confusion is the substitutability of timing rules and many
voting rules—an issue we addressed in Part I under the heading of “waiver.” Consider
Senate Rule XIV.1, which provides that “Whenever a bill or joint resolution shall be
offered, its introduction shall, if objected to, be postponed for one day.” At least in
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principle, the Senate could change this rule by a supermajority vote,94 suspend the rule by
majority vote with notice,95 or suspend the rule by unanimous consent without notice,96 in
which case the rule does not force delay at all. If a majority supports the bill, then it can
first suspend the rule (assuming 60 Senators vote for cloture), and then vote in favor of
the bill; if a majority rejects the bill, then the rule has no effect in any case. We suggested
in Part I that reputational concerns might prevent this type of behavior. If members of a
chamber believe that timing rules make sense in general, they may refrain from
undermining the effectiveness of these rules by suspending them whenever they interfere
with the immediate enactment of a bill they favor.
Supposing this is the case, then it seems clear that the timing rules and the other
types of procedural rules address different types of problems, although these problems
might be closely related. Consider, for example, a simple comparison of a supermajority
rule that provides that a bill passes a chamber only if a supermajority votes for it, and a
delay rule that provides that a bill passes a chamber only if a majority votes for it twice—
at an initial period 1 and then after delay, at period 2.97
To understand the effects of these rules, imagine that members’ political
preferences can be distributed along a line segment, with extremes at the end and the
median in the middle. Suppose two bills are under consideration: one would reduce
funding for family planning and one would eliminate funding for family planning. The
median member of (say) the House favors reduction of funds, but the member who would
be needed for a supermajority favors no reduction. Thus, if the supermajority rule is in
place, no law will be passed.
At first sight, the delay rule would seem to allow the law to be passed. If the
median member of the House supports the law, then under majority rule the law passes.
However, the truth is more complicated. The reason is that the identity of the median
voter can fluctuate over time, and the requirement of two votes implies that the median
voter at both time periods support the bill. Given the possibility that a person who
supports the bill the first time might oppose it the second time, an effective supermajority
is necessary for the bill to survive.
An example will clarify the argument. Suppose that all members’ preferences for
the reduction in funds remain fixed between period 1 and period 2 except that of one
person. Let us assume that N people favor the status quo and N people favor the reduction
94
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in funds. The remaining person—the potential tie-breaker—favors the status quo with
probability 0.5, and favors reduction in funds with probability 0.5, reflecting the
ambiguous balance of political forces in her district. (We might also imagine that in the
interim she could be voted out of office and replaced.) If the bill is subject to a single
vote, then the probability that it is enacted is 0.5. But if the bill must pass two votes
separated by a delay, and the middle voter simply votes in favor of the position reflected
by the balance of political forces in her district each time, then the probability that the
vote will pass falls to 0.25. Thus, two majority votes separated by delay together with
variance in preferences is effectively much stricter than a single majority vote or two
majority votes that occur in rapid succession.
However, an interesting property of the dual vote system is that the effect of
timing is variable. The effective strength of the voting rule increases with the variance of
political preferences with respect to the relevant issue. If preferences are stable, then the
median voter stays the same, in which case the second vote will be exactly the same as
the first vote, and the overall probability of enactment is 0.5. If preferences are highly
variable, the overall probability of enactment could fall, as we have seen, to 0.25. By
contrast, a (for example) supermajority rule with no temporal dimension might be hard to
satisfy in general, but its effect remains constant with respect to variability in
preferences.98
Should this difference matter? One can imagine situations where it would.
Suppose that one of the benefits of a supermajority rule is that it prevents legislative
churning—the excessive enactment and repeal of laws because of rapid changes in
political coalitions. The cost of the rule is, of course, that many desirable bills will not
pass because a supermajority cannot be constructed. The dual voting rule solves the
churning problem without requiring such high decision costs when the conditions for
churning do not exist. When preferences are variable and thus churning is a danger, the
dual voting rule is an effective supermajority rule. When preferences are not variable,
then churning is less of a danger, and thus the dual voting rule, by serving as an effective
(simple) majority voting rule, allows legislation to proceed. To be sure, the requirement
of two votes and a delay raises decision costs, and so the overall assessment of the rule
would require one to take account of delay and multiple-voting costs as well.
Our purpose here is not to prove that timing rules are better than voting rules or
vice versa. Clearly, both types of rules are needed. Our more limited aim is to show that
timing rules have distinctive and sometimes attractive properties, and that these
properties may explain why timing rules constitute an important subset of procedural
rules.
B. Enforcement
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For timing rules to have meaningful effects on legislation, the rules must be
enforced, either by Congress itself, the President, or the courts. None of these alternatives
is without problems. Internal enforcement of rules by legislators constitutes a selfregulation regime in which regulated parties can waive the regulations. External
enforcement of restrictions on congressional procedure is notoriously difficult. However,
if each institution is capable of partial enforcement, timing rules can still produce
important effects on legislative outcomes. Indeed, there are several reasons exist to think
enforcement of timing rules will be easier and more effective than restrictions on the
content of legislation.
1. Congressional Enforcement
Suppose no external actor is capable of enforcing timing rules. Congress might
nonetheless self-regulate and enforce timing rules. Earlier we suggested that reputation
and a generic norm in favor of rule-following in Congress might be sufficient to enforce
timing rules, at least sometimes. An alternative to reputation and norms alone would be to
give the Rules Committee in either House some sort of special enforcement authority.
One alternative would include the responsibility to issue a public report every time
legislation is passed without satisfying the timing rules;99 another would be to grant
authority to file ethics charges against legislators voting for a bill that failed to satisfy
timing rules. But for the regime to work, the Rules committee would have to have good
incentives—refusing to look the other way—when the rest of Congress has bad
incentives. This is possible, but unlikely, at least absent a mechanism for altering the
incentives of a discrete subset of legislators. If the rules committee faces the same
incentives as the rest of Congress, then generic norms backed by reputation may be the
only viable congressional enforcement scheme. Nor is it clear that ethics charges or
(more modestly) a public pronouncement whenever a timing rule is violated would be a
wise use of Congressional resources. One might “statutize” timing rules to make them
more binding. Virtually all statutes that fix procedural rules also contain a clause making
disclaiming any limitation on the constitutional authority of each house to make its own
rules, but using statutes without such disclaimers remains a possibility. Such statutes
would likely vest courts with the authority to enforce procedural rules, a possibility that
we discuss below.
Although Congressional enforcement of timing rules is imperfect, it is
theoretically possible. A long tradition in Constitutional law suggests that Congress must
interpret the Constitution for itself rather than rely on judicial judgment and
enforcement.100 If the argument has vitality in the context of constitutional interpretation,
there is no reason to assume that congressional enforcement of timing rules would be
impossible. Nor is it clear that internal enforcement of timing rules is any more difficult
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than congressional enforcement of any of its rules. Although rules are regularly waived,
they are also regularly adhered to and enforced.
2. Presidential Enforcement
Might the President be a more effective enforcer of timing rules? Suppose the
President proclaimed that he would veto any legislation that failed to satisfy relevant
timing rules, either because the rules were waived explicitly by a House of Congress or
implicitly, as when a chamber ignores the timing rules. If the President could credibly
make this pronouncement, it would constitute a partial fix for the enforcement problem.
Unfortunately, in most cases a presidential statement like this one is not credible. And
even if the President would like to hold himself to the statement, we know of no legal
mechanism that would allow him to do so in a credible way.
When Congress passes a bill without satisfying timing rules, the President must
choose between the status quo ante (without the new bill) and the proposed bill.101 So
long as the proposed bill is closer to the President’s ideal point than the status quo of no
new legislation, the President’s short term interest will be to sign the bill rather than veto
it. While there may be circumstances in which the President would take the short-term
loss to obtain a long-term gain, we think it unlikely that enforcement of timing rules
constitutes such a case. Indeed, even if the President were (somehow) 50 percent more
likely to veto legislation that failed to satisfy relevant timing rules, Congress could
simply adjust the content of legislation to make it more attractive to the President. So
long as the enforcement of timing rules constitutes a substantive policy value, we are
hard pressed to see why the President would not simply bargain around the outcome,
trading the enforcement of timing rules for some other policy goal. Additionally, if the
President could credibly commit to vetoing any piece of legislation that failed to satisfy
relevant timing rules, enforcement would still be imperfect because Congress could
override the President’s veto, in effect, choosing to reassert its initial timing rules waiver.
Thus, while Presidential enforcement of timing rules might be a marginal improvement
on congressional self-enforcement, it is unlikely to be a significant fix.
3. Judicial Enforcement
If Congress and the President are imperfect enforcers of timing rules, would
courts be better? Although this is not the place for a critique or defense of judicial review,
the case for judicial enforcement of timing rules is stronger than in many other areas of
the law. For example, even if one supports judicial review of statutes for constitutionality,
it is uncontroversial that courts sometimes struggle with the task of substantive review. If
a statute is reviewed under the rational-basis test, it is virtually always upheld; if the
strict-scrutiny standard is applied, the statute is almost always struck down. In part, this is
because of the decisional burdens imposed by doctrine that asks judges to determine
whether a state interest is “compelling enough” or whether a statute is “related enough,”
for example, to interstate commerce. When called upon to evaluate the substance or
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merits of legislation, courts regularly struggle, not because of ineptitude, but because of
the nature of the inquiry doctrine requires.
Identifying whether certain procedural requirements were met in the legislative
process is relatively straightforward (although identifying instances of genuine waiver
rather than rule-flouting may not be).102 The rules versus standards debate in the legal
literature suggests related reasons that judges may good at enforcing timing rules. A
deadline imposes low decision costs on the enforcing judge; compare a rule that requires
agency action “in a reasonable time period.” In general, if one thinks judges are good at
judicial review of statutes, there is every reason to think that judges will be better at
enforcing timing rules than substantive restrictions on congressional power. If one is
skeptical about judicial competence in substantive judicial review, there is reason to be
less skeptical about judicial enforcement of timing rules.
This is also true in other areas of the law. For example, an important debate in
administrative law concerns whether judges should review the substance of policy
decisions by administrative agencies or instead hold agencies to exacting procedures
designed to ensure good decisions.103 Historically, one side of this debate urged that
judges should steep themselves in technical knowledge and evaluate the content of
agency judgments; the other side urged that judges could not possible make informed
judgments about such matters, but could still make policy better by aggressively
enforcing procedural restrictions on agency decisions.104 Our thesis picks up on this old
strain of debate, suggesting that judicial competence is better tailored to the enforcement
of procedural restraints like timing rules than substantive review of legislation.
A problem for our view is that courts have often refused to enforce Congressional
rules of procedure.105 Given our suggestion that courts could do so cheaply and
effectively, this brute fact might be unsettling. However, to say that judges usually do not
enforce Congressional rules is not to say that they should not do so. If legislators
conclude enforcement of timing rules would have desirable influences on policy,
congressional intent would be a reason for judges to enforce rather than ignore timing
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rules. Unlike many internal congressional rules that either serve mundane ends or that
Congress would clearly prefer courts not enforce, timing rules serve ends that facilitate
democratic governance. If courts prefer not to enforce internal rules out of respect for
coordinate branches or congressional preferences, timing rules might constitute a special
case warranting an exception. If courts are nonetheless hesitant, the simplest way to
facilitate judicial enforcement would be for Congress to enact a statute directing courts to
enforce the rules.106
Moreover, judicial refusal to enforce congressional rules of procedure does not
preclude judicial enforcement of all timing rules. At a minimum, judges could and should
enforce constitutional timing rules and statutory timing rules. Judicial reluctance to
enforce congressional rules might be a reason to codify timing rules in statutes or
constitutions, rather than a reason to eschew judicial enforcement altogether. Indeed,
courts regularly enforce constitutional procedural requirements.107 Many state courts also
enforce other procedural restrictions far more unwieldy than timing rules. Single-subject
rules are a prime example. Many state constitutions (and some statutes) contain clauses
prohibiting legislation on more than one unrelated subject.108 Ascertaining whether a
given law runs afoul of a single subject limitation is notoriously difficult, but state courts
enforce the procedural limitation anyway. One reason state courts struggle with this task
is that single-subject limits require judges to make substantive evaluations about how
closely linked different parts of legislation are; single subject rules are procedural
restrictions that require content-based evaluations for enforcement. Because the
enforcement of timing rules does not, timing rules are likely to be cheaper and easier to
enforce than existing content-based procedural restrictions.109
None of these institutional actors—Congress, the President, or the courts—will be
perfect enforcers of timing rules; but, each is capable of partial enforcement. A mix of
reputation, norms, and internal sanctions provides Congress with some enforcement
resources. Although the President is unlikely to credibly commit to wield his veto to
enforce timing rules, perhaps a greater presidential emphasis on clearing timing rule
hurdles would support relevant congressional norms. Most timing rules enforcement is
likely to be done by the courts. The pitfalls of judicial enforcement are not trivial, but nor
are they so severe to warrant outright rejection of the regime. At a minimum, there are
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good reasons to think courts would be more willing and more able to enforce timing rules
than other forms of limitations on congressional action.
C. Retroactivity
To this point, we have focused on legislation that is exclusively prospective. The
possibility of retroactive legislation affects our analysis in several ways.110 Like delay
rules, a requirement of prospectivity may reduce the effects of narrow self-interest on
decisions because circumstances may change in the future.111 Because actors know the
past, but are uncertain about the future, a ban on retroactivity could reduce the ability of
actors to narrowly tailor law to their own self-interest, at least at the margin. The legal
bias against retroactive legislation is consistent with our theory of delay rules in that both
delay rules and the presumption against retroactivity sometimes make it more difficult to
enact legislation that pays off private interests. However, the effects of delay and
prospectivity are independent.
Another way of putting this point is that Congress could undermine the beneficial
effects of delay rules if it can enact retroactive legislation too easily. Earlier, we
suggested that delay rules facilitate monitoring of agents by the public, and reduce the
relative influence of interest groups over legislation. Delay allows slow and diffuse
public attention to mobilize, reducing the advantage of well organized groups in the
legislative process. However, public attention is often short-lived. Once public attention
wanes, private interests can lobby again. Suppose that the delay in period i mobilizes the
public to oppose a bill successfully that gives a tax benefit to the energy industry; no
legislation is enacted in period i. By period i+1, public attention has waned, but the
attention of industry has not. If the industry can now lobby and obtain legislation in
period i+1 that applies retroactively to period i, the delay rule will not have prevented
“bad” legislation during period i. Retroactivity, therefore, allows actors to evade some
timing rules. The bias in the law against retroactivity may support the democracyenhancing facets of delay rules on the legislative process.112
Timing rules may also encourage legislators to rely on retroactive legislation. If
strong delay rules make immediate legislation costly, legislators will rely on deferred,
conditional, or anticipatory legislation. If private actors or legislators prefer that benefits
be accrued for activity during period i, when delay rules prohibit it, retroactive legislature
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enacted in period i+1 will be more attractive, all else equal. If retroactivity is bad (for
reasons outside our framework), then either a presumption against retroactivity or weaker
delay rules could reduce the frequency of retroactive legislation. The basic point is that
timing rules can make retroactive legislation more attractive to legislators and
retroactivity can undermine the effect of some timing rules.
A related topic is legal transitions. Scholars have long debated whether people
whose wealth declines as a result of legal change should be compensated.113 The simplest
setting is the taking of private property, but the basic arguments apply to any kind of
legal change, such as regulatory change. On the one hand, compensating people for their
losses provides them with insurance that might not be available in the market, and might
cause the government to internalize the costs of its actions. For example, when the
government condemns land for a new highway, property owners should anticipate this
risk and be insured, and the government should be forced to take account of the costs as
well as benefits of the highway. On the other hand, compensating people for their losses
reduces their incentive to anticipate the changing needs of society and future government
projects, with the result that they will overinvest in their property. In addition, if they
want insurance against potential takings, they may be able to purchase it from private
insurance companies. At the same time, it is far from clear that a compensation
requirement causes the government to internalize the costs of its actions when taxpayers,
rather than government officials themselves, pay these costs.
The debate has proceeded so far as though the only alternatives were full
compensation (“just compensation” under the fifth amendment) or no compensation at
all. However, delay rules provide an intermediate approach. With respect to the
government, a delay requirement extends its time horizons, and increases the probability
that a condemnation planned today will not occur until after the next election. Property
owners have a chance to mobilize, and if there is some probability that a new party will
take power, the delay rule reduces the risk that condemnations will be pursued for
partisan reasons. Delay does not directly compensate the property owner, of course, but it
will increase her bargaining power with respect to the government, which may be willing
to pay her to sell quickly. A delay rule therefore provides more compensation than none
at all.
D. Delegation of Regulatory Powers to the Executive Branch
Timing rules also implicate a range of important issues concerning delegation to
the executive branch. In our framework, delegation to the bureaucracy is a form of
conditional legislation, where the administrative agency evaluates whether the benefit of
the legislation is greater than the costs. Delegation of this decision to an agency entails
the standard laundry list of problems generated by principal-agent models.114 At a
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minimum, the agent might err; it might act strategically; it may have interests that diverge
from Congress; or it may shirk. To these existing insights, our argument suggests
delegation is a form of timing legislation and also a function of timing rules.115 Congress
enacts legislation immediately, but any benefit or future sanction is evaluated and
specified by the administrative agency. As we have suggested, strong delay rules may
increase pressure on the legislatures to enact legislation in early time periods, with details
filled in by agents in the future. Delegation can be made more or less likely by adjusting
timing rules.
Related, Congress also uses a range of timing mechanisms to regulate the timing
of agency actions, speeding up or slowing down the timing of bureaucratic decisions.
Some of these timing mechanisms are explicit. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
established a detailed timeline for EPA generation of regulations of specific air pollutants
and designation of areas.116 For example, the Act required that governors submit area
designations (attainment versus nonattainment) no later than one year after the
promulgation of a new national ambient air quality standard,117 but the Administrator
may not require the list sooner than 120 days after the new standard is promulgated.118
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the Federal Communications Commission
to review the degree of competition in the telecommunications industry every three years
and adjust regulations accordingly.119 Many organic statutes contain delayed
implementation clauses that provide 30-90 days before newly promulgated agency rules
go into effect. Other agency timing rules are de facto. When Congress requires a decision
on the record after an opportunity for a hearing, the statute triggers the time-consuming
formal rulemaking and formal adjudication requirements of sections 556-557 of the
Administrative Procedure Act.120 Even informal notice-and-comment rulemaking is timeconsuming, taking months or years, rather than days.121 Perhaps these provisions of the
APA should be understood as timing rules as well.
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Whether explicit or implicit, delay rules of this sort serve many of the same
interests in the administrative context as in the legislative context. Delay allows the
principal (Congress) to better monitor the agent’s (bureaucracy) decisions. Delay rules
also allow the public time to organize and monitor, thus potentially reducing the
influence of interest groups over the formation of regulation. However, both delay rules
and rapidity rules are important. Either because agencies get captured by the interests
they regulate (who may prefer no regulation) or because agents might shirk (and prefer
inaction), deadlines on administrative process and decisions are equally important for
controlling behavior. The agent might make a poor evaluation of whether B>C, or simply
be lazy and be slow in making the determination. Because benefits are discounted, delay
after the true value of B is realized imposes pure costs and no additional benefit.122 For
example, the Toxic Substances Control Act123 requires the agency to issue initial
recommendations for listing of toxic substances within nine months.124
Although we have focused on the legislature, the basic analysis can be applied
with equal force to the bureaucracy. Although many components of the administrative
process are regulated by Congress and courts, agency flexibility to choose the form and
timing of decision is still the rule. Agencies are free to choose between rulemaking and
adjudication,125 between formal and informal rulemaking,126 between making new policy
immediately legal binding or only tentatively so.127 There is nothing to preclude an
agency from adopting its own procedural timing rules. Analogues to the typology of
legislation also exist. The agency equivalent to conditional legislation is the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, followed by a Final Rule. The NPRM announces that they agency
will address a policy problem and proposes a tentative rule or regulation. At the end of
notice-and-comment, the agency adopts the rule if the benefits of the rule exceed the
costs. The rule generally applies prospectively in the period of final adoption. An agency
might also rely on interim final rules that are binding and in place until “final” final rules
are enacted and upheld. This sequence is a rough analogue to the use of anticipatory
legislation that can be repealed in period 2, except that the interim rules are in force
during period 1. Thus, administrative agencies face many of the same choices about the
optimal timing of regulation, and the constraints thereon.
Another example that has received a great deal of attention in the literature is
President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291, which required agencies to submit certain
regulations for review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB) within the executive branch.128 OMB review
was supposed to ensure that agency regulations complied with cost-benefit analysis, but
many critics believed that it was intended merely to delay regulation by requiring it to
survive an extra layer of bureaucratic scrutiny by an intentionally understaffed office.129
President Reagan’s anti-regulatory philosophy lent credence to this charge, but President
Clinton preserved OMB review because it gave him greater control over the regulatory
process.130 However, if OMB review was an implicit delay rule, Clinton partly countered
this effect by issuing a rapidity rule, requiring that OMB review take no more than ninety
days.131
Indeed, the evidence does suggest that timing is an important choice variable in
regulation. Interest groups try to delay regulations that burden them; Congress tries to
slow down and speed up regulations depending on their political value; and regulatory
agencies themselves time regulations in response to pressures from interest groups,
Congress, and others.132 Thus, it would not be surprising if the President tried to counter
these pressures by imposing timing rules of his own.
If we think of OMB review as a pure delay rule, albeit shortened by President
Clinton, it is susceptible to our analysis above. Delay does reduce the value of regulation
by pushing its benefits off to the future—and anti-regulatory bias could well be the
reason why President Reagan enhanced OMB review in the first place. But a delay rule
also could have the beneficial effects that we have itemized. First, it allows additional
information to emerge prior to issuance of the regulation; if this information indicates
that the regulation will have unforeseen negative effects, then regulatory harm can be
headed off. Second, it might reduce the effect of deliberative pathologies. If agencies
polarize, or are trapped by polarized public views, then delay might help them avoid bad
regulation.133 Third, it might limit the agenda-setting power of agencies by giving
hierarchical superiors in the executive branch a chance to inform themselves of the
effects of regulations.134 Fourth, it could reduce the incentive of interest groups to lobby
for regulations by reducing their net present value. Whether these beneficial effects were
an actual result of OMB review—either President Reagan’s original approach or
Clinton’s modified version—remains an open empirical question.
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CONCLUSION
An obvious way to structure political institutions to generate desirable policy is to
regulate the content of legislation. Familiar examples include judicially enforced
constitutional restrictions on legislation that categorizes on the basis of race or sex or
legislation that imposes mandates on states without providing federal funding. Just as
important, but less discussed, is regulation, including self-regulation, of the procedures
used to enact statutes. In this Article, we have emphasized a subset of this second group:
timing rules. Regulating the timing of legislative action avoids the well-known
difficulties with regulating content, namely, that judges are poorly positioned to secondguess the policy judgments of legislators and to balance policy goals and constitutional
values.
Timing rules support democratic goals by facilitating monitoring of legislators by
the public, of committee members by floor-members, and as a general matter of agents by
principals. Timing rules can help filter out laws that are not public spirited without
precluding laws on specific subjects (e.g. race distinctions) or by form (e.g. singlesubjects). Like other restrictions on legislation, however, timing rules are not costless,
and can prevent legislatures from acting quickly when a crisis occurs or slowly when
deliberation is necessary. They are also vulnerable to evasion, just as content-based
restrictions are. The proper use of timing rules depends on context, and so one cannot at a
high level of abstraction say whether the current system is optimal or not. Indeed, we
have noted that Congress could use timing rules for bad ends, and this possibility must
always be kept in mind. Timing rules then are no panacea. Like any tool, they can be
used well or poorly.
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